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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARILYN MANDARINO OWEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 15330

ROBERT BALLARD OWEN,
Defendant and Respondent.

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This matter is before the Supreme Court on appeal from
a decision of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, denying Plaintiff-Appellant's petition
for modification of a divorce decree as to child support payments.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
The lower court ruled that there had been no substantial
change of circumstances since the decree and denied PlaintiffAppellant' s petition for modification of child support.
RELIEF ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have this Court reverse the judgment
of the lower court and to grant Plaintiff-Appellant's request
for modification of the divorce decree.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Appellant files this reply brief to answer
Respondent's unfair characterization of her financial situation
and his misrepresentation of the facts as discussed in his
brief.
The statement of facts in the two previously-filed briefs
appear to be undisputed as far as what events have occurred up
to the present time in this case.

However, there appears to be

sharp disagreement as to what inferences and assumptions can be
drawn from the undisputed facts.
Respondent, in his brief, characterizes the Appellant
as an irresponsible money-manager, who has dug her own grave and
must now bury herself in it.

He further alleges that she is

totally unconcerned about her children's welfare and is simply
attempting to increase her own standard of living by trying to
get "disguised alimony"

(Respondent's Brief p.14).

He further

misrepresents that she quit a job in order to create an impoverished
appearance to harass the Respondent through her allegedly unfounded
court actions (Respondent's Brief p.14).

Appellant submits that

she would indeed be an irresponsible money-manager if she sat
back and watched her children forego the necessities of life
without attempting to make her former husband share in the cost
of such necessities.

-2-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
RESPONDENT HAS MISREPRESENTED APPELLANT'S
FINANCIAL SITUATION AND HER PRESENT ATTEMPT TO MODIFY
RESPONDENT'S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION.
A.

Appellant's unemployment at the time of the hearing.

Respondent's brief first attacks Appellant's present income
situation and accuses her of "taking steps to set up artificial
grounds" for a modification of the divorce decree (Respondent's
Brief p.11).

For example, Respondent accuses the Appellant of

quitting her job in order to present a picture of poverty to
the court (Respondent's Brief p.6).

However, Appellant testified

that she quit her job under fire; that she had a choice of quitting
or being fired.

(Tr. p.4)

She did not quit because she discovered

she "disliked working" or because she found working "distasteful"
as Respondent suggests.

(Respondent's Brief p.7)

At the hearing, Appellant elaborated on the reasons for
leaving her job.

One of the several reasons was that her bosses

were dissatisfied with her typing skills since she suffered the
burns on her hand.

(Tr. 5)

A quick reading of the transcript

quickly dispels any notion that Appellant quit her job to "set up"
a destitute financial picture for this modification hearing.
Furthermore, Plaintiff stipulated in court that she had the
capacity to earn $600.00 every month, although she was unemployed
at the time of the hearing.

Thus, it is unfair to harp upon her

unemployment as a ploy to gain sympathy with the court.
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B.

Appellant does not have "unclean hands."

Respondent claims that Appellant has "unclean hands" and
accuses her of lying about her income sources.
Brief p.10)

(Respondent's

In particular, Respondent points out that Appellant

never listed on her "income affidavit" that she was receiving
an average of about $250.00 a month from her father.

(Respondent's

Brief p.10)
Appellant testified, however, that she could not list her
father's contributions as income because she did not receive a
set amount each month.

Instead, every so often her father

to her rescue and gratuitously bailed her out.

ca~e

(Tr. pp. 19-20)

To accuse Appellant of lying for not listing unsolicited, irregular
and unexpected gifts from her father which she

af~er-the-fact

estimated to average $250.00 a month seems to be unfair.
The true facts are that she is no longer receiving any
assistance from her father who is presently in a rest home.
(Tr. p. 7)
It is also interesting to note that Respondent accuses
Appellant of lying for not listing irregular gifts as income,
but at the same time he testified that he doesn't list his
$5,000.00 equity in the home among his assets because he doesn't
know when he will receive it.

(Tr. p. 31)

He also failed to list

that asset on his response to Appellant's Interrogatories.
(Tr. p.31)

Respondent continued to assert on the stand that the
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$5,000.00 was not an asset even though Appellant's counsel asked
him if he would sell it (the interest) for $4,000.00.
that he would not.

He responded

It appears to be a misrepresentation of the

facts to accuse Appellant of lying for not listing irregular
gifts as income when Respondent refuses to list equity in a
house as an asset.

c.

Appellant's "229% increase in income."

Respondent next asserts that Appellant has "manipulated
her income to present a destitute picture" and asserts that she
has enjoyed a 229% increase in income since the time of the
divorce.

(Respondent's Brief p.14)

Such an assertion not only

mischaracterizes her attempt to modify Respondent's child support
obligation but is completely ridiculous arithmetically and
logically.

For example, to come up with that percentage, counsel

for the Respondent conveniently chose the highest monthly salary
that Appellant has ever earned.

Next, he multiplies that by 12

to get a fictional yearly income and then adds the child support
Respondent pays to come up with an entirely speculative yearly
income.

(Respondent's Brief pp.3,6)

Of course, the fact that

such an amount was never received by Appellant does not prevent
Respondent's counsel from using that figure to calculate what
her percentage increase in salary has been.

To obtain a base

figure for calculating Appellant's increase in income, Respondent's
counsel adds only her child support and alimony received in 1973.
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(Respondent's Brief, p. 3)

He conveniently forgets to include

the $672.00 she received in 1973 from a real estate contract.
(Tr. p.6)

He also fails to include the $225.00 average monthly

help her father gave her.

It is interesting to note, however,

that when Appellant did not include that latter sum in her
affidavit, Respondent's counsel accused her of "lying."
(Respondent's Brief, p.10)

Nevertheless, he also conveniently

fails to include it in her income when to do so makes his arguments look better.

Thus, he has successfully manipulated her

highs and lows to the point that she is allegedly now making nore
than enough for her needs.
Such a computation is faulty.

If counsel wishes to compare

percentages, he would need to start with all sources of income
for the Appellant in 1973.

In that year (the time of the divorce)

she received $672.00 off a real estate contract.

(Tr. p.6)

She

also received $2,400.00 that year in child support and $1,800.00
in alimony.

She also received approximately $250.00 each month

from her father.

($3,000.00 that year)

(Tr. p.7)

Thus,

Appellant's income for that first year was $7,772.00.
As to her present income, Appellant received $600.00 net
for the first five months of 1977 and stipulated that she would
be capable of earning $600.00 gross every month thereafter or
about $500.00 net.
$6,500.00.

Her total net "earnings" would then equal

Her child support is $2,400.00.

She no longer

receives income from the real estate contract, alimony or her
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father.

Thus, her net income this year was $8,900.00.

Therefore,

her increase in net spendable income has been about 14% in four
years -- a far cry from the 229% Respondent's counsel suggests.
Respondent's attempt to discredit Appellant's financial situation
is a blatant attempt to mislead the court and only accentuates
the weakness of his argument against the increase in child support.
In addition, even if Appellant did enjoy any income increase
since the time of the divorce, such an increase was contemplated
by the terms of the decree itself.

Appellant was the mother of

a preschool child at the time of the divorce and obviously unable
to work fulltime.

She was given alimony for 18 months.

That

alimony has long since terminated and now that both children
are in school, Appellant can work more.

Thus, it is unfair to

attempt to penalize her for earning more money when in reality
she is only accomplishing what the decree of divorce contemplated.
The fact that she has worked since her alimony was terminated
is no basis for denying an increase in child support on the
grounds that her income has increased over the years.
accusation is unfair.

Such an

It is obvious that any benefits the

children receive from their father also indirectly benefit

~heir

mother and frees up money for other purposes, but to characterize
that as a "disguised" attempt for alimony seems to be an attempt
to cloud the issue of a child support modification.
D.

Respondent's alleged "26% increase" in income.

Respondent's counsel attempts to disguise Respondent's

-7-
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increase in income by alleging that Appellant has enjoyed a
229% increase in income since the time of the divorce.

Such

reasoning has been discussed above.
Respondent's increase in income during the same period of
$13,944.00 to $19,008.00 should really speak for itself.

He

supports only himself on that amount (less his child support
obligations) while Appellant supports herself and two children
on $8,900.00 in net spendable
payments).

income (including child support

Such a sum represents a figure less than half as

large as Respondent's income.
In addition, Respondent's counsel argues that Respondent's
increase from $13,944.00 to $19,008.00 has been eaten up in
increased costs of living.

(Respondent's Brief, p.15)

If that

is true, it is only because he is now living alone in a threebedroom condominium.

(Tr. p.32)

Also, Respondent's counsel appears to have made another
arithmetic error.

He asserts that Respondent has enjoyed a 26%

increase in income in the four years since the divorce.
dent's Brief pp. 3, 6, 15)

(Respon-

Although Respondent's gross income

figures speak for themselves, a quick mathematical calculation
shows the increase to be 36%, not the listed 26%.
Finally, it should be noted in any comparison of Respondent's
income for the years 1973 and 1977 that the Respondent no longer
pays Appellant any alimony and his net spendable income has
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increased $1,800.00 a year by that fact alone.

Thus, his net

spendable income has actually increased more than the bare gross
figures listed above.
E.

Appellant's equity in her house does not release

Respondent from his obligation to support his children.

Next,

Respondent argues that the Appellant does not need additional
child support because he asserts that she is sitting on a virtual
gold mine.
in her home.

He asserts that she has at least $25,000.00 equity
However, Respondent does not suggest how Appellant

is to tap that great source of wealth.
Apparently she has two alternatives.
mortgage the home.

First, she can

However, such action would only increase

her monthly bills which she already cannot meet.
can sell the home and move into an apartment.

Second, she

While such a

solution is possible, Respondent can hardly be serious to suggest
that his children be forced to move out of their home just to
make ends meet when he has the resources to prevent that action.
It would seem more profitable to reserve such a drastic action
for later years, if needed, to give the children a college
education or to meet unexpected emergencies as they occur.

In

addition, the price of an apartment may well prove to be more than
her present house payment.

Thus, Plaintiff should not be required

to sell her home in order to obtain an otherwise unreachable equity
which she has therein where Respondent has the means to prevent
such action.

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Several other considerations should be made with respect
to Appellant's equity in her home.
First, the Plaintiff's equity in her home should not be
used to disguise Defendant's responsibility to support his
children.

"Her" property should be distinguished from that of

the children.

The children need to look to both parents to

support them.

See Erickson v. Erickson, 8 Utah 2d 381, 335

P.2d 618, 619

(1959).

Her equity in the house does not relieve

Respondent from his obligation of adequately supporting his
children.
Second, the Plaintiff did not receive a disproportionate
amount of equity in the home at the time of the divorce.

The

vast majority of the present equity is the result of the rise
in prices of homes in the Salt Lake Valley which has occurred
recently, as well as her making four years of payments on the
home with her father's help.
Third, aside from the fact that Respondent would benefit
to the tune of $5,000.00 cash if Appellant had to sell her home,
he fails to mention that the only reason the couple was able to
buy the house at all during the marriage was the fact that the
Appellant's father contributed $7,000.00 towards the purchase
of their first house.

(Tr. p.25)

Respondent needs to distinguish between money that is the
Appellant's and the obligation which Respondent has to support
his children.

-10-
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Finally, testimony at the hearing suggests that the
Respondent also has a substantial equity in his three bedroom
condominium.

(Tr. p. 34-36)

A recent case from the State of Oregon, MacDonald v.
MacDonald, 566 P.2d 542 (Ore. 1977), is instructive and very
much on point.

Therein, both the husband and the wife had

debts of approximately $5,000.00.

The court increased the

former husband's child support obligation from $110.00 per
month to $200.00 per month despite the fact the former wife had
a "fairly substantial equity" in the home where she and the children lived and despite the fact that the former husband had no
assets of any consequence.

Similar to the present case, the

Defendant's husband had an income of $21,145.00.

(Defendant-

Respondent herein makes $19,008.00 at his present salary.

See

Tr. p. 26)
F.

Appellant's purchase of clothing.

Respondent alleges

that Appellant's purchase of $375.00 worth of clothing for herself
in January of 1977 illustrates her financial irresponsibility
and that she has no meritorious argument for increased needs.
(Respondent's Brief, p.4, 11, Tr. p.18)

Appellant explained at

the hearing how she had no clothing suitable for the employment
She was able to obtain and was required to add to her clothing.
The sum of $375.00 for an entire working wardrobe does not appear
to be high where she had to start from scratch.
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POINT II. APPELLANT HAS PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
FOR THE COURT TO MODIFY THE DIVORCE DECREE.
A divorce modification hearing is an action in which the
trial court has a large amount of discretion.

However, Appellant

submits that the lower court erred in its order denying Appellant's
requested modification.

Respondent's counsel did not submit any

findings of fact and conclusions of law to the lower court for
signature and the record does not contain any such pleadings.
Therefore, this court must rely upon the transcript of the proceedings in determining whether the lower court abused its
discretion and erred in its judgment.
At the conclusion of the hearing, Respondent's counsel
argued that general inflation and increased ages of minor children
could not be a basis for modification of a divorce decree.
(Tr. p.42)

Appellant has previously pointed out that such an

argument is wrong.

(Appellant's Brief pp. 6, 7)

However, without

any findings of fact or conclusions of law, Appellant has no way
of knowing if the court erroneously believed the arguments of
Respondent's counsel.

If he so believed, this court must correct

that erroneous belief and make its ruling on the facts under that
doctrine.
Appellant showed at the lower court hearing that her
children were going without some necessities of life (see
Appellant's Brief pp. 3-5) while Respondent was living alone in
his three bedroom condominium on his $19,008.00 yearly income.
(Tr. p.32)
-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellant submits that a reading of the transcript clearly
shows that the lower court erred in denying her request to modify
the divorce decree.
CONCLUSION
Despite Respondent's counsel's misrepresentation of the
facts, his mathematical miscalculations and his allegations of
bad faith on the part of the Appellant, the record and transcript
clearly show that the lower court erroneously denied her modification petition.
It is true that benefits received by her children also
indirectly benefit the Appellant.

However, the present action

is not a ploy to obtain "disguised alimony".

Appellant's concern

is that her children can eat properly (Tr. p. 16), have drapes
on windows in their home (Tr. p. 14) and be able to participate
in normal activities of life such as music lessons, etc.

(Tr. p. 21)

As this Court stated in DeRose v. DeRose, 19 U.2d 77, 426
P.2d 221 (1967):
"Due to the seriousness of such proceedings [divorce]
and the vital effect they have upon people's lives . . •
changes should be made if that seems essential to the
accomplishment of the desired objectives of the decree:
that is, to make such an arrangement of the property and
economic resources of the parties that they will have the
best possible opportunity to reconstruct their lives on a
happy and useful basis for themselves and their children."
426 P.2d at 222.
Appellant respectfully submits that the instant case presents
a situation where "changes should be made" to accomplish the "desired
objectives of the decree" in order to provide adequately for the
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minor children of the parties.
DATED this

7 +"'

day of March, 1978.

Joseph L. Henriod
Bruce J. Nelson
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
SERVED the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant by delivering
two copies thereof, personally, to Robert Felton, Attorney for
Respondent, Twelve Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
thl.. s
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day of March, 1978.
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